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This paper examines developments in the euro area housing market, with
particular reference to the last ten years. Since the mid 1990s, the rising
trend in euro area house prices has been remarkable both in its duration
and strength, persisting during a phase of economic slowdown. However,
developments have been far from uniform across the euro area, and there
have been considerable differences in the experience of individual
countries. This paper endeavours to explain why we observe such a
diversity of house prices, in an area with a common currency and common
interest rate. While the significant fall in interest rates over the past number
of years has been an important determinant of the rise in house prices in
many countries, differences in the structure of housing and mortgage
markets have also played a big role. As a consequence, housing markets
remain strongly national in character.
1. Introduction
For the vast majority of individuals, the purchase of a house is,
by far, the largest single economic transaction made in their
lifetime, and residential property represents the most significant
part of household assets in most economies. With housing the
single biggest component of household wealth, housing market
developments have the potential to have a significant impact on
the economy. In particular, changes in house prices can, through
their impact on wealth or by reducing liquidity constraints,
influence consumer spending.
In contrast with historical patterns, the behaviour of house prices
in recent years has been uncharacteristic. While economic
activity slowed, house prices rose — and, in the case of many
euro area countries, at an accelerating rate. In large part, this is
the result of historically low interest rates, changing
demographics and financial liberalisation. Since the mid-1990s,
the global economy has seen a strong and sustained rise in the
value of housing, with an acceleration in house price inflation
evident in many countries over the past five years. During this
time, rising housing prices have boosted household wealth and
have been perceived as playing a key role in mitigating the
cyclical downturn in economic activity as well as cushioning its
impact on the financial sector. However, buoyant property
markets have not only boosted household wealth in recent years,
* The author is an economist in the European Monetary Affairs and International Relations
Department. The views expressed in this paper are the personal responsibility of the author
and are not necessarily held by the CBFSAI or by the ECB. The author would like to thank
John Flynn and John O’Leary for their comments and invaluable assistance in completing
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but have also stoked a sharp rise in household debt, and the risk
of declines in house prices and their interaction with higher levels
of household debt, pose important challenges going forward.
This paper examines developments in the euro area housing
market, with particular reference to the last ten years. The paper
compares house price developments across a number of euro
area countries, and in particular endeavours to explain why we
observe a diversity in housing developments in an area with a
common currency and common interest rate. Also addressed are
the risks and challenges, which have intensified as a
consequence of buoyant property markets.
The paper is set out as follows. In the first section, the housing
market cycle is introduced, examining recent developments in
house prices. Having discussed the various macroeconomic
variables that may affect house price movements, section 2
introduces the role of institutional differences in mortgage
markets, and how they can strongly influence housing market
developments, while section 3 discusses the role of national fiscal
measures. Section 4 progresses to examine what impact
developments in house prices over the past number of years
have had on the broader economy, notably, through their effect
on wealth and consumption. Section 5 considers the extent to
which the scale of house price increases in some countries has
heightened the risk of overvaluation and discusses the
macroeconomic implications of a bigger stock of household
debt. Finally, the conclusions are set out in section 6.
Section 1
1.1 The housing market cycle
In all countries developments in the housing market tend to track
the business cycle, and there is a tendency for real house price
peaks and troughs to lag business cycle turning points. However,
the lag between house prices and the business cycle differs
across countries and also differs between cycles. Recently, the
lags have lengthened and house prices have actually accelerated
after the turning point in the business cycle (this has been most
clearly evident in the US, UK, Australia, Ireland and Spain).
1
Recent developments in the housing market reflect the unusual
nature of the economic cycle since the late 1990s. The economic
slowdown that began at the end of the 1990s reflected the
ending of the investment and stock market boom, which
significantly, was non-inflationary. As a consequence, and
atypically compared to all other post-war cyclical slowdowns, it
was neither the result of nor the trigger for a monetary tightening.
Instead, the sluggish nature of the 2002-2003 recovery led to
deflationary concerns and consequently monetary policy eased
1 Related to this, more than three years after the equity market started to collapse house
prices continue to rise in many countries, and even if house prices were to peak in the
near future, this would imply a longer than average lag by historical standards, between
equity and housing market peaks.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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across the major economies, and, even where it was
subsequently tightened, has remained broadly accommodative.
With interest rates relatively low and with inflation subdued,
bond yields have reached historical lows, stimulating the housing
market. Housing demand has also been supported by relative
return considerations in recent years. With households wary of
equities, following the dotcom bubble, and less attracted to
bonds given their low yields, the housing market has become
attractive. What is more, the relaxation of liquidity constraints as
a consequence of ongoing financial liberalisation, at a time when
interest rates are at historical lows, has further fuelled housing
demand. Borio and McGuire (2004) highlight the role of
monetary policy when it comes to the emergence of sequential
equity and housing price booms; their results suggest that
housing booms tend to lag equity booms, with the lag of the
length depending on the level of interest rates. Against this
background, the lengthened lag between the business cycle and
the housing cycle is understandable.
1.2 House price developments: Stylised facts
Historical evidence indicates that property prices are characterised
by long swings, with industrial countries experiencing about two
full cycles over the period between 1970 and 2003. Furthermore,
house price cycles have shown some international
synchronisation over the past three decades. For instance, the
euro area, US and UK have all experienced a rapid increase in
house prices over time. However, there have also been
differences. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, euro
area house prices were much slower to rise compared to those
in the US and the UK. Since the mid 1990s, the US, the UK and
the euro area have all experienced a rapid increase in real house
prices. However, the scale of price increase has varied — since
1996, real residential prices have increased by 30 per cent in the
euro area, 50 per cent in the US and 115 per cent in the UK.
2
It is also evident in the euro area that the pattern of real house
prices (i.e. adjusted for inflation) has differed markedly across
countries, taking a long-term perspective. During the period
1970-2003, real house prices hardly moved in Germany and rose
only modestly in France and Italy. In contrast, in Spain, the
Netherlands and Ireland, real house prices have risen
considerably. While real house prices in the EU have followed
long cycles around an upward trend, at a country level, however,
the scale of residential property price movements continues to
be very diverse — and even under economic and monetary
union, divergences have persisted. While inflation has been
muted in most countries, real house prices have expanded at a
much faster pace, with the exception of Germany, where they
hardly rose. In the period (1998-2003), the standard deviation of
real house price growth across countries was almost four times
2 According to the European Commission, Volume 4, No. 2 (2005).Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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that of inflation, according to IMF estimates, and thus low and
stable inflation has co-existed alongside very different housing
market developments.
3 In summary, while there may be some
similar broad trends, developments have been far from uniform
and there have been considerable differences in the experience
of individual countries.
Since the mid 1990’s (the beginning of the present cycle)
nominal house prices have risen at an accelerated pace in most
EU countries, and some countries (Greece, Spain, France and the
Netherlands) have had very strong, close to or above double-
digit average house price increases since 1999.
4 Currently
available data indicates that euro area residential property prices
are estimated to have recorded their fifth consecutive year of
strong dynamism in 2004, increasing by 7.4 per cent, which is
slightly up from 7.1 per cent in 2003. (See Table 1 below).
Developments in recent years reflect the buoyancy of the market
in Spain, Ireland, France and Italy. For more than two years,
prices have been broadly stable in Italy and Spain, while in
France the upward tendency has only been a more recent
phenomenon, and seems partly explained by the catching up in
residential property prices from the mid-1990s. However, in
Greece and the Netherlands, growth in house prices has
moderated, and there is also some slowdown in the rate of house
price growth in Ireland in the last year. In contrast, in Portugal
prices have risen only very modestly in recent years, while in
Germany house prices have actually fallen. (The relative flatness
of German real residential property prices is, in part, due to
flexible supply conditions and an oversupply of new dwellings
after unification).
Table 1: Residential property prices in euro area countries
(nominal, annual percentage change)
1997-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Belgium 5.0 5.3 7.7 7.8 6.8
Germany − 0.5 0.1 − 1.2 − 0.9 − 2.0
Greece 10.5 14.5 13.0 5.7 —
Spain 7.8 15.6 16.7 17.6 17.3
France 4.5 7.9 8.3 11.7 15.3
Ireland 21.1 8.1 10.1 15.2 11.4
Italy 2.1 8.0 12.9 10.0 9.0
Luxembourg 3.8 13.8 11.9 13.3 —
Netherlands 13.8 9.7 6.2 2.6 4.0
Austria − 2.0 − 3.6 − 1.2 — —
Portugal 5.8 3.6 1.1 1.6 0.4
Finland 10.7 − 0.5 7.4 6.2 7.1
Euro Area 3.9 6.0 6.8 7.1 7.4
Sources: National sources and ECB calculations
3 IMF, Article IV Selected Issues, Chapter III ‘‘House prices and monetary policy in the euro
area’’ (2005).
4 The last upswing was seen in the late 1980’s, when real house price growth increased
throughout the period from 1986 to 1989, reaching nearly 9% in 1989. This upswing ended
abruptly in 1991, and was followed by a period of falling real house prices up to 1998.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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1.3 Determinants of house prices
This raises the question of what determines house prices and
why there has been such diversity across a common currency
area with a common interest rate. In looking at determinants of
house prices, the theoretical literature highlights how the
interplay between common demand and supply factors and
differences in the institutional features of housing and mortgage
markets can lead to very different developments across
countries. Factors that influence demand in the longer run
include growth in household disposable income, shifts in
demographics, permanent features of the tax system that might
encourage home ownership, as opposed to other forms of
wealth accumulation, and the average level of interest rates.
Long-term determinants of supply include the availability and
cost of land, construction costs and the quality of existing
housing stock. (Refer to Box 1 for a discussion on ‘The Dynamic
Model of the Housing Market’).
Property markets also tend to be intrinsically local in character
and can be strongly influenced by particular characteristics,
which can differ substantially across countries. The demand for
houses is determined by demographic dynamics in each country;
the supply of new homes can be constrained by land availability
and the local land planning system; the financial cost of home
purchases depends to a large extent on the housing financing
system; and the liquidity of the housing market may be further
constrained by the existence of transaction costs such as VAT,
stamp duties and registration fees, as well as real estate taxes. All
of these factors are specific to each market, and can lead to cross
country differences in housing price movements. The
responsiveness of supply is also an important factor that variesQuarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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Box 1: The Dynamic Model of the Housing Market
At a theoretical level, there is a single widely accepted standard textbook
model of the housing market. The two-equation model suggests that in the
short-run, all other things being equal, house prices tend to overshoot their
long-term values in a boom. Figures 1 and 2 below try to explain this
phenomenon.
Examining Figure 1, at a given level of demand D, we observe that for any
level of house prices below P1, an excess demand for housing exists, while
for any level of house prices above P1, excess supply exists. Under
conditions of short-run equilibrium, any stimulus to housing demand will
result in a rise in house prices. In the short-run, the supply of housing is
relatively fixed — i.e. the supply curve is almost vertical, meaning supply is
inelastic or relatively unresponsive to prices. The demand curve, is, as usual,
downward sloping. Recognizing this, if there is a fall in the user cost (or an
increase in disposable income), the demand curve shifts to the right to D’.
Since in the short run supply is inelastic, the demand curve shifts from 0 to
1, and prices increase to match the relatively fixed supply of houses (P2).
However, in the long run, supply becomes more elastic and responsive to
prices, as can be seen in Figure 2. This is represented by a relatively flat
supply curve, and the housing stock increases and moves to a point 2. As
a result prices fall (P3).
An increase in demand will raise prices because supply is fixed in the short
term. If buyer’s expectations about future prices and lenders’ willingness to
extend credit are both based on recent price increases, demand will then
rise further, pushing prices higher still.
While the theoretical model is important in explaining housing market
dynamics, in the real world, where we observe credit rationing, spatial
effects and tax treatment on owner occupancy, things may turn out
somewhat differently. Taking account of these features in practice is more
difficult — largely related to empirical and econometric complexities.
Furthermore, the view that both the supply and demand for housing
interact to determine an equilibrium level for real house prices should not
be taken to imply that house prices are necessarily stable. In many
countries it is frequently observed that house prices are significantly more
volatile than would be predicted by the variation in the main determinants
of supply and demand alone.
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substantially across countries. Since the supply of new housing
can only respond sluggishly to demand in the short run, house
prices can deviate from their long run trends for a considerable
length of time. The supply response will largely depend on local
legislative and structural factors, as well as tax and subsidy
policies.
5 In addition, the functioning of the housing market also
depends on the housing financing system, which varies
significantly between countries in terms of contract
arrangements, tax breaks and subsidies.
In summary therefore, national differences can reflect not only
differences in the stage of the business cycle but also distinctive
local factors related to the elasticity of supply, funding methods,
subsidy/tax policies and legal frameworks. We will now turn to
look at how some of these factors play a role in explaining
differences across the euro area.
Section 2: The Role of Institutional
Developments in Mortgage Markets
The above discussion suggests that, in addition to the usual
macro-economic variables, house price developments can be
strongly influenced by the particular characteristics of the
international housing markets. Consideration of some of these
factors e.g. demographic factors, legal frameworks etc, is outside
the scope of this study. Instead, the paper focuses on two
elements — the role of institutional differences in mortgage
markets across the euro area and the impact of differences in
housing related fiscal measures across countries — which help
explain some of the diversity in house prices.
2.1 Key Characteristics in the Mortgage Market
When looking at the role of mortgage markets, it is useful to
begin by considering the manner in which a number of key
characteristics differ across countries.
Using the taxonomy suggested in IMF (2005), it is useful to look
at four aspects that differ across countries:
 Mortgage interest rates are either variable or fixed. The
household sector’s sensitivity to interest rate changes
depends on whether households have mainly fixed or
variable rate mortgages. Those countries/households that
use predominantly variable rate mortgages will be more
sensitive to changes in interest rates.
 Mortgage assets are securitised. If credit institutions can sell
excess exposure in the secondary market, this could lead
to more flexible mortgage contracts. Securitisation
5 The fact that new housing supply is less responsive to price developments in some
countries, such as the Netherlands, the UK and some Nordic countries, has partially
contributed to recent housing booms in these areas (Zhu, 2005).Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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contributes to mortgage risk diversification and, hence,
reduces the sensitivity of the banking sector’s lending
capacity to housing price cycles.
6
 The maximum loan-to-value ratio (i.e. the typical amount of
the mortgage loan relative to the value of the house). The
LTV ratio has risen in most countries in recent years. The
ceiling level determines the degree of conservatism of
mortgage lending, which affects the strength of the credit
channel. Where high LTV ratios exist, households become
more indebted.
 Mortgage equity withdrawal. If households can withdraw
home equity to take advantage of low refinancing rates and
increased house values, then the credit channel of
monetary policy could be enhanced, with knock-on effects
for both consumption and house prices.
Table 2: Characteristics of mortgage markets
Mortgage
equity Securitisation
Interest rate withdrawal Average LTV Typical loan (mortgage-
adjustment* (MEW) ratio (%) term (years) backed)
Belgium F No 83 20 No
Germany F No 67 25-30 No**
Greece V n.a. 75 15 n.a.
Spain V Unused 70 15 Yes
France F No 67 15 No**
Ireland V Yes 66 20 Yes**
Italy Mixed No 55 15 No
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. 20-25 n.a.
Netherlands F Yes 90 30 Yes
Austria F n.a. 60 20-30 n.a.
Portugal V n.a. 83 15 n.a.
Finland V Yes 75 15-18 No**
Denmark F Yes 80 (max) n.a. No
UK V Yes 90-100 25 Yes
US F Yes 75-80 30 Yes
*Classification based on the majority of mortgage loans, F= Fixed, V= Variable.
**Securitisation remains very limited.
Sources: ECB (2003), Tsatsororis and Zhu (2004), European Commission (2005), European
Mortgage Federation.
The results from Table 2 suggest:
Mortgage interest rates: The impact of short-term interest rate
changes is likely to be stronger in Ireland, Spain, Finland and
Portugal, (where variable interest rates are predominant),
whereas in France and Germany, movements in policy interest
rates over the business cycle should only have a small effect on
mortgages. (See Box 3). Furthermore, the typical duration of the
mortgage contract as well as the duration of the interest rate that
anchors mortgage rates differs across countries, which will have
an impact.
7
6 Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004)
7 The sensitivity of the household sector to interest rate changes will also depend on the
degree to which a possible change in interest rates was anticipated by households at the
time they initiated the mortgage.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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LTV ratio: The average loan-to-value ratios vary strongly between
countries — averaging just above 70 per cent for the euro area
as a whole. The LTV ratio is particularly high in Belgium,
Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal, while it is particularly
low in Italy and Austria. Changes in the lending criteria have had
a significant impact on the LTV ratio.
Mortgage securitisation: There is some evidence of mortgage
securitisation in Spain and the Netherlands and, to a more limited
extent in Ireland, France and Germany.
MEW: Overall, in the euro area, mortgage equity withdrawal is
still in its infant stages. While there is some evidence of MEW in
Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Portugal, it is still minimal. On the
other hand, in the Netherlands, MEW has had a significant
impact. (See Box 2).
The extent of owner occupation can amplify the importance of
the mortgage market structure. As illustrated in Table 3 below,
owner-occupancy rates differ considerably across the euro area.
Ownership is around or above 80 per cent in Ireland, Spain, Italy
and Greece, while in Germany and the Netherlands, it is around
50 per cent or lower. In those countries where a low percentage
of ownership prevails, changes in mortgage interest rates may
tend to have less of an impact on households finances.
















Source: European Commission (2005)
In this regard, MacLennan, Muellbauer, and Stephens (1999) find
that countries with fixed interest mortgage rates, low loan-to-
value ratios, high transaction costs, and a smaller owner-
occupied sector tended to experience lower house price
volatility and smaller consumption effects. Giuliodori (2004)
argues that house prices enhance the effect of monetary policy
on consumption when mortgage markets are more competitive,
while Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) discover that the impact of
credit on house prices is more muted in countries where lending
is conservative and equity withdrawal is rare. Furthermore, it is
likely that for countries, which previously had high interest rates,
the convergence of long-term interest rates as part of the move
to EMU has also had an impact.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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Box 2: Mortgage Equity Withdrawal
Mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) is defined as household borrowing that
is secured on the housing stock but not invested in housing, or more
specifically, it measures mortgage lending available for consumption or for
investment in financial assets, and thus, may be an important transmission
channel through which house price cycles affect the rest of the economy.
When house prices rise, the amount of collateral available to households
increases, which enables households to increase their borrowing by over
or re-mortgaging.
A manifestation of the flexibility of the mortgage market has been the
withdrawal of home equity by households to take advantage of low
refinancing rates, greater availability of products such as home equity loans
and increased house values. It has enabled households to smooth
temporary declines in income, and furthermore, it has allowed them to
borrow against expected future income, by using their house as collateral,
significantly easing liquidity constraints.
As mentioned already, overall, in the euro area, MEW is still in its infant
stages and remains uncommon. In contrast, in the US, UK, Australia and
the Netherlands, the process of mortgage equity withdrawal has played a
significant role in boosting consumption in the past number of years. In
Australia, MEW is estimated to have increased household disposable
income and consumption growth by around 1 per cent in each of the past
four years (Reserve Bank of Australia 2003), while in the UK and the US,
equity withdrawal boosted household income by over 2 per cent in 2000
(Davey (2001) and Deep and Domanski (2002)). In the Netherlands,
meanwhile, research by the Dutch Central Bank indicates that MEW
contributed around 1 percentage point to economic growth in 1999 and
2000, while a halving of the level of equity withdrawal in 2001 reduced
consumption growth by around 0.5 percentage points in both 2001 and
2002. There are a number of reasons for these differences, but in general,
MEW reflects the level of owner occupation, the level of housing wealth,
the turnover of housing market transactions, and most importantly, the
degree of liberalisation in financial and mortgage markets.
Empirical evidence suggests that mortgage equity withdrawal boosts
disposable income and supports consumption in a number of ways. It is
used for home improvement, to repay other debt and also for household
expenditure. A smaller amount appears to be used on the stock market
and on other financial institutions, and also on real estate and business
investments. In addition, it is also used to restructure balance sheets.
However, in order to continue to boost consumption growth, the amount
of equity extracted needs to continue to grow, since if it remains constant,
there is no additional boost to income and, thus, no growth in consumption
from this source.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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Box 3: What influences the type of mortgage chosen?
To date, little cross-country analysis exists on the national reasons why
consumers might prefer certain types of mortgages. Research undertaken
in the US by Campbell and Cocco (2003), however, suggest that there are
a number of advantages to the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). They
believe that these advantages stem from the fact that people tend to benefit
from a low initial rate, and since homeowners tend to have relatively stable
income at present, they are therefore able to take on more risk. In addition,
there is evidence to suggest that consumers tend to prefer mortgage
contracts that they consider to have the ‘‘most competitive rate’’, and tend
to focus on the immediate monthly costs, perhaps ignoring longer-term
income or wealth risks. The underlying structure of the country’s financial
market, nevertheless, greatly influences the various funding possibilities. In
countries where funding for mortgages is based on short-term deposits,
adjustable-rate mortgages are prevalent. On the other hand, in countries
with well-developed covered bond markets or deep and liquid mortgage-
backed securities, markets tend to have a higher proportion of fixed-rate
mortgages — most obvious in the US (IMF, WEO September 2004). In
Denmark and Germany, fixed rate mortgages are also prevalent, where
specialised private mortgage banks are granted licences to insure long-term
debt against mortgages.
In addition to the structure of mortgage markets, it is likely that
financial liberalisation has also played an important role. Until the
1980s, the mortgage market in most member countries was
highly regulated and competition was weak. Specialised
institutions, which operated with a dedicated source of funds and
enjoyed either a monopoly of such funds or significant tax or
funding subsidies, dominated mortgage activity, with each
mortgage market tending to be tightly regulated by national
authorities.
8 These regulations effectively resulted in credit
rationing in the mortgage market, which made it difficult for
households to borrow for house purchase or increase
consumption in the wake of higher property prices. Through the
1980s and 1990s, financial deregulation occurred in nearly all
developed countries, (although the timing and extent of the
deregulation varied considerably across countries), and as a
result, changes in the structure of the lending market seems to
have had a significant effect on the extent of household
borrowing. Debelle (March 2004) makes the point that a
significant part of the growth in household borrowing may thus
reflect a move from a suboptimally low (from the households
point of view) level of indebtedness in the period prior to
financial deregulation to a higher, more optimal, level now that
households are no longer liquidity constrained. This is likely to
have allowed households to better structure their path of
consumption spending over the life cycle. Notwithstanding the
deregulation that has occurred, however, there remain
institutional features, which differ across countries, and can still
result in some households being liquidity constrained.
8 These regulations included the fixing and lending of deposit interest rates, quantitative limits
on mortgage credit extensions, ceilings on permissible loan-to-value ratios and repayment
periods, and a prohibition on the granting of credit for current spending.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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2.2 Indebtedness
As a consequence of the relaxation in credit constraints following
financial deregulation, and as a result of a reduction in mortgage
interest rates, household borrowing has increased substantially
over the past decade, raising concerns about the sustainability
of indebtedness. Furthermore, as inflation rates have fallen, the
associated decline in nominal borrowing rates has allowed
households to borrow larger amounts for a given amount of debt
service, while favourable tax measures have also affected
borrowing. However, the timing, extent and rate of the increase
of debt have varied considerably across countries. Table 4
indicates that household debt has increased substantially in
recent years, and the bulk of the increase in household debt has
been in the form of borrowing for housing, although growth in
borrowing for other purposes, particularly in the form of credit
card debt has also exceeded that of income. Looking specifically
at the euro area, borrowing for housing loans currently accounts
for as much as 88 per cent of total household borrowing in the
Netherlands, approximately 80 per cent in Portugal and Ireland,
and around 70 per cent in Spain. Furthermore, housing loans as
a percentage of GDP rank highest in the Netherlands, Portugal,
Ireland, Spain and Germany. However, the aggregate numbers
on the indebtedness of the household sector conceal substantial
variation in the distribution of the debt across individual
households.
Table 4: Household debt
Ratio of
Lending to Housing housing
households* loans loans to total
as % GDP as % GDP household
Country 2004 Rank 2004 Rank lending Rank
Austria 41.6 8 20.9 11 50.2 12
Belgium 37.9 10 28.4 8 74.9 5
Germany 65.5 5 43.4 5 66.3 9
Spain 69.4 3 48.5 4 69.9 7
Finland 42.9 7 30.1 7 70.2 6
France 41.2 9 28.2 9 68.4 8
Greece 34.3 11 21.7 10 63.2 10
Ireland 69.4 3 55.1 3 79.4 3
Italy 27.6 12 14.8 12 53.6 11
Luxembourg 45.0 6 36.3 6 80.7 2
Netherlands 84.3 1 74.4 1 88.3 1
Portugal 71.5 2 56.6 2 79.2 4
Source: Internal CBFSAI data.
*As at June 2005.
Regardless of whether households have ‘‘over-borrowed’’, the
large stock of household debt has important macroeconomic
implications. As a result of increased indebtedness, the
household sector has become more exposed to fluctuations in
income, interest rates and house prices, raising concerns about
the vulnerability of consumer finances. These issues are
discussed in more detail in section 5 of this paper.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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Section 3: The Role of Fiscal Measures
As discussed already, mortgage debt levels and similarly
increases in house prices vary largely in the euro area, and such
diversity reflects the fact that housing market determinants are
still national in nature. The rapid growth of mortgage debt and
of house prices in the euro area and in many industrial countries
is giving rise to increasing concerns of policymakers. While much
focus has been given to its possible monetary policy implications,
there has been a lack of attention paid to the role of fiscal factors
in influencing house prices. In a monetary union such as EMU,
the widely different tax systems that exist is one element behind
house price divergence.
Fiscal and government policies interact with the dynamics of
housing markets in a number of ways. In general, fiscally
responsible behaviour may support favourable conditions in
financial markets thereby increasing affordability of home-
ownership. More specifically, measures including taxation on
imputed rent, tax deductibility of interest payments, capital gains
taxes on housing gains, VAT on the supply of new buildings, and
stamp duties when buying a home affect mortgage and price
developments. Moreover, a number of structural fiscal measures
can be used to stabilise the housing market. These include
increases in stamp duties, increasing the tax base in line with
house prices (i.e. regular updating of market values of dwellings
as the tax base for property tax and wealth tax), increasing the
number of years a primary house must be occupied to be
exempt from capital gains tax
9 and structural reductions in
mortgage interest relief. Furthermore, supply-side measures, such
as land and planning restrictions, subsidised housing loans from
state banks and rent regulations are other measures that can
affect the housing market.
The literature in this area (Poterba (1991)) and (Van den Noord
(2003)) indicate that house prices can be influenced by a
combination of price-inelastic (i.e. unresponsive) supply of newly
built houses and preferential tax-treatment of housing. According
to these models, while the demand for owner-occupied housing
declines as the purchase price rises, the price sensitivity of
demand tends to fall with the degree of preferential tax treatment
and the expected house price inflation. A fall in the interest rate
also produces a reduction in the price sensitivity of demand. In
circumstances where all three prevail — i.e. preferential tax
treatment, falling interest rates and expected house price inflation
— demand is likely to be much less sensitive to price rises. (See
Box 4 for a discussion on the impact of a positive tax treatment
on housing.)
In order to examine the extent to which owner occupancy is
influenced by tax regimes, it is useful to begin by considering
9 However, this increases the cost of moving, which negatively affects labour mobility rates.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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what neutral tax arrangements might be. In a tax neutral system,
whether an owner of a residence decides to occupy it, or rather
to rent it out, would not be affected by tax considerations. Table
5, below, outlines the various tax treatments on owner-occupied
housing across the euro area.
Table 5: Tax treatment on owner-occupied housing
Capital
Interest cost gains* Imputed Stamp duty Wealth Inheritance
Country Deductible t/E rent T/E rates tax tax
Austria Y (50%) t E 6% N Y
Belgium Y (50%) t T 5-12.5% N Y
Finland Y (29%) t E 0-4% N Y
France N t E 2-3% Y Y
Germany N t E 3.5% N Y
Greece Y (40%) E E 11-13% N Y
Ireland Y (42%) t E 0-9% N Y
Italy Y (45%) t T 3% N Y
Luxembourg Y (38%) t T 7-10% n.a. n.a
Netherlands Y (52%) E T 6% N Y
Portugal Y (40%) t E 0.8% N Y
Spain Y (45%) t E 0.5-1.5% Y Y
Sources: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2003) and Bank for International
Settlements (2003). The table generally presents the situation for an owner-occupier living in
his/her dwelling.
*Capital gains tax: the small letter ‘t’ refers to capital gains tax as being in place, but the gains on
selling a house being in effect exempted (normally only principle residence), because selling it a
certain number of years after its acquisition is tax-exempted.
Examining Table 5, the following conclusions can be arrived at:
 Interest deductibility, which provides a fiscal advantage to
homeowners, is evident in all countries bar France and
Germany. While it is usually only available to owner-
occupied dwellings, arrangements vary across countries.
 In principle most countries apply capital gains tax;
however, many homeowners are often exempted,
especially if they have occupied the dwelling for a number
of years before selling it (acts as an anti-speculation clause).
 In only a minority of countries (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands) did owner-occupiers have to report
imputed rent for tax purposes to their national tax offices
in 2003.
10
 Finally, the supply of housing is generally subject to a
reduced VAT rate, while, with respect to stamp duties,
there is a multiplicity of arrangements — rates vary from 0-
13 per cent.
Comparing the tax neutral system to the tax regimes in place in
euro area countries, suggests that most tax systems, on balance,
provide some sort of preferential treatment. Van den Noord, who
attempted to calculate housing tax wedges for euro area
10 This tax puts owning a home and occupying a home on an equal footing with other
investments, which offer a financial return rather than services in kind.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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Box 4: Impact of a positive demand shock — i.e. a positive tax
treatment on housing
As a development of Box 1, this box illustrates how price dynamics behave
following a positive (permanent) demand shock — with special emphasis
on the tax treatment of housing. The first figure illustrates what would
happen if the tax treatment on housing were not generous, while the
second figure depicts that situation when the tax treatment of housing is
generous. (Van den Noord, 2003).
Where the tax treatment of housing is less generous, the demand curve
will tend to be relatively elastic (i.e. flat). In such a case, in response to a
shift in demand, the equilibrium moves along the vertical short-run supply
curve S from A to B, since supply is inelastic in the short-term. In the longer
run, however, supply expands and moves towards the long-run equilibrium
C. Therefore prices initially increase and then come back down again, but,
nevertheless, settle at a higher level than prior to the shock. In the second
figure, where the tax treatment of housing is more generous, the demand
curve is now relatively inelastic (i.e. steeper) because the impact of price
increases on demand will be offset by the tax break. The shock now
produces a sharper initial increase in the price level (from A to D), and a
sharper subsequent fall, than in the first scenario.
countries, supports these results. While based on 1999 data, his
results indicate that housing is subsidised, to some degree, in
most euro area countries. On the basis of his calculations, the
only exceptions are Germany, France and Belgium, where the
tax arrangements in relation to housing are judged to be neutral.
Section 4: Housing and the Macroeconomy
Having discussed and examined the development of house
prices over the past number of years, the natural progression is
to examine what impact this has had on the broader economy.
The link between housing market developments and economic
growth has attracted much attention in recent years. This reflects
the frequently made observation that, in many countries, where
consumption has been resilient over the recent cyclical
downturn, house prices and mortgage debts have risen sharply.
The paper now turns to look at the link between housing markets
and the business cycle in the euro area.
Figure 1
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4.1 House prices, wealth and consumption
It is perceived that a relationship exists between house prices
and consumption. This relationship may be causal, or it could
possibly be driven by other factors such as strong economic
growth or low interest rates. The characteristics and structure of
mortgage markets play an important role in shaping the link
between housing markets and growth, and in particular, the
wealth effect. Theory suggests that, as house prices rise, there is
a corresponding wealth effect and an easing of liquidity
constraints, which may result in mortgage backed borrowing.
However, on the flipside, the cost of housing services rises (i.e.
rents) and there is a change in the distribution of wealth.
In general, housing market developments are seen to have the
potential to affect consumption in three ways. First, there can be
an income effect, with consumption increasing as a result of the
direct impact of lower interest payments on household debt.
However, the scale, or even existence, of this effect will depend
on the extent to which the household sector has positive net
holdings of interest-bearing assets. In many euro area countries,
this is the case, thus offsetting the impact of lower debt interest
payments. There is also what is seen by many as the primary
channel, the potential impact of higher house prices on
household sector wealth and, in turn, on consumption and
savings behaviour. Finally, there is a collateral effect, through
higher house prices raising the value of available collateral and
loosening credit constraints.
In recent years, much consideration has been given to the extent
to which rising house prices have fostered consumption and
economic growth through wealth effects, in a period when other
wealth components (notably financial wealth) were declining,
thereby operating as a channel in shaping the business cycle.
Theoretically the issue is complicated because house prices have
both a wealth effect and a relative price effect. An increase in
housing wealth is different from an increase in financial wealth
for two reasons. Firstly, it causes a redistribution of wealth within
the household sector, and secondly, it has mostly short-term
effects on non-housing consumption. In practice, households are
either renters or owners of housing, and so, not all will benefit
from rising house prices. The real incomes of those households
that are renters is reduced by the increased cost of housing,
while future generations or first time buyers (FTB) suffer welfare
losses. In effect, there is a transfer of wealth from FTB/renters to
existing homeowners. Hence, there is a decrease in consumption
from renting households because of the price effect, and an
increase in consumption from current homeowners as a result of
a wealth effect. The net effect of a rise in house prices is therefore
ambiguous and will depend on different propensities toQuarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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consume, the share of owner occupied housing and the extent
to which rents move in line with house prices.
11
Empirically, in some countries (which are discussed in more detail
further on) a positive relationship can be observed between
changes in housing wealth and consumption, and hence
demand, although this varies in terms of significance across
countries, and can depend on factors such as the financial system
in specific countries. There are a number of reasons why we
observe such a relationship. Firstly, the average propensity to
consume of homeowners may exceed that of renters,
12 secondly,
households regard part of the rise in house prices as a rise in
savings which is available to boost current consumption, thirdly,
households are able to finance greater consumption by
borrowing against the increased value of the house, and finally
homeowners can be myopic (i.e. as interest rates are lowered,
homeowners focus on having more disposable income since
their monthly mortgage repayments have fallen).
Although the issue of the size of the housing wealth effect has
attracted significant attention in some countries such as the US
and the UK, empirical research on housing wealth in the euro
area is still relatively sparse and cross country comparisons
remain relatively difficult. Nevertheless several studies have
attempted to quantify housing wealth effects in a multi-country
setting. Some of their findings are listed below.
 An OECD study by Catte et al (2004) suggests the
existence of significant housing wealth effects in the US,
UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia and,
furthermore, that the housing wealth effect appears to be
larger than the financial wealth effect in these countries. By
contrast, in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, the
consumption response to changes in housing wealth
remains limited. Furthermore, their findings indicate that
the size of the effect of housing wealth on consumption
appears to be positively related to the mortgage market
size, since the influence of the housing market on
consumption depends on the extent to which homeowners
are able to borrow against their housing wealth. In addition,
several other parameters may also be pivotal in explaining
the strength of the link between house prices and
consumption. In keeping with the findings of section 2
above, wealth effects are likely to be strongest in countries
where there is a high degree of home ownership, the
financial system is sufficiently liberalised, and there are
marked gains in housing equity. Certain other mortgage
market characteristics, and in particular the degree of
11 Debelle (June 2004).
12 Non-homeowners are more likely to be saving for their home deposit, whereas
homeowners who tend to be further advanced in the life cycle will need to save less
(Debelle (June 2004)).Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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‘‘completeness’’ (i.e. Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK
appear to have the most complete mortgage markets in
terms of the range of products offered, such as second
mortgages and equity release products, as well as the
choice of alternative interest rate adjustment and
repayment structures), strengthens the wealth effect on
consumption. Lower transaction costs and higher owner-
occupation rates may also assist this transmission process.
 An IMF study by Ludwig and Slok (2004) estimates a
consumption function using data for 16 OECD countries.
The analysis finds, not surprisingly, that the long-run impact
of an increase in house prices is, in general, higher in
countries with market-based financial systems. Splitting the
sample into two periods, the 1980s and the 1990s, they
also find that countries have moved towards a higher
degree of responsiveness of consumption to changes in
house prices. Furthermore, more recently, the house
wealth effect has functioned through the refinancing of
loans, due to the significant drop in mortgage rates
experienced in most OECD countries.
 The correlation between the house price cycle and the
consumption cycle is examined in the recent European
Commission quarterly report on the euro area (2005)
13.
From the analysis, (see Table 6 below), the correlation
between house prices and consumption cycles has
traditionally been much stronger in some countries, (e.g.
Spain, the Netherlands and Finland) than in others
(Belgium, Germany and Italy). Furthermore, most countries
have experienced a drop in the correlation since the 1990s,
in particular in Germany and Belgium. On the other hand,
in Ireland and to a lesser extent in France, the link appears
to have strengthened.
Table 6: Correlation between the house price cycle and the
consumption cycle* (in %)
Correlation with the private consumption cycle
1976-2003 1991-2003











*Log-linear trend for house prices and HP filter trend for consumption.
**(1991-2002)
Source: European Commission Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (Volume 4, no. 2, 2005).
13 European Commission, Volume 4, No. 2 (2005).Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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However, this type of correlation may be misleading, as
there could be other variables (for example, income)
driving the growth in both house prices and consumption.
Therefore, examining the saving ratio gives a better picture,
as the existence of a wealth effect tends to lead to
consumers feeling a reduced need to save, which would
result in a fall in the savings ratio (see Table 7 below). In
France, Germany and Ireland, savings, rather than falling
have kept pace with disposable income, suggesting that
there is no evidence to indicate that the boom in house
prices is impacting on consumption through a wealth
effect. In contrast, savings have fallen as a per cent of
disposable income in Finland and the Netherlands.
Table 7: Household savings rates (per cent of disposable
income)
1991 1996 1999 2003
Finland 7.1 0.4 1.5 0.6
Netherlands 13.8 13.0 9.6 10.1
France 8.7 10.0 10.4 11.1
Germany 13.0 10.8 9.8 10.7
Ireland 9.3 8.2 9.8 11.9
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, CSO Ireland
 Finally, a UK Treasury study
14 found that the link between
changes in house prices and spending has been close in
the UK; however the link was not as strong in other EU
countries, and also the results varied considerably between
countries. Private consumption also appears to react more
quickly to changes in house prices in the UK, with the
effects being less drawn out compared with other EU
countries.
In summary, higher house prices can affect household sector
wealth, and in turn, consumption and savings behaviour.
However, the effect varies in significance across countries, and
the financial system of a specific country matters.
Section 5: Challenges and Risks
While the above analysis indicates that both much of the recent
strength of housing markets and differences in cross-country
performances can largely be rationalised, the scale of house price
increases in some countries has given rise to concerns that there
may be some degree of overvaluation. More generally, for the
economy at large, the bigger stock of household debt has
important macroeconomic implications.
5.1 Are house prices overvalued?
In analysing the housing sector, house prices are generally
decomposed into their fundamental and non-fundamental
14 HM Treasury (EMU study) Chapter 6, 2003.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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components; if house prices exceed the fundamental price on a
systematic basis, then they are likely to be overvalued. According
to the theory, (as discussed in Box 2), in the short run, real house
prices tend to overshoot their long run value, since supply
responds more slowly, resulting in an immediate rise in the
current level of real house prices relative to other goods and
services. In the longer run housing supply should respond,
weakening the impact of demand variables such as income and
interest rates on real house prices.
In many countries, real house prices have been rising at a very
fast pace — fuelled by low short-term interest rates and strong
growth in credit. It is therefore argued that house prices look
more overvalued now than at previous peaks, since average
house prices stand at record levels in relation to wages and rents.
What is more, inflation is close to its lowest for half a century
and, there is a concern therefore, that overvalued real house
prices cannot, as in the past, regain their long-term equilibrium
mainly through inflation, raising the concern that house prices
will have to fall in money terms.
The rapid rate of increase in house prices is, however, necessary,
but not sufficient evidence of overvaluation. The concept of
overvaluation has meaning only if there is some divergence
between house prices and some measure of their underlying
value. Two measures that are commonly used to gauge evidence
of overvaluation are house prices relative to household income
and house prices relative to rents (the latter being equivalent to
the idea of a price/earnings ratio of housing
15). However, these
measures must be interpreted with a degree of caution, since
there are a number of caveats with regard to the comparability
of the data.
Firstly, looking at the house-price-to-income ratio, evidence
points to national disparities. Stephensen and Koster (2004) find
that the Dutch, Irish and Spanish housing markets appear highly
valued in relation to personal disposable income; Belgium,
Finland, France and Italy appear moderately valued in relation
to personal disposable income; while Germany and Greece are
relatively inexpensive in comparison. In the case of Germany,
house prices have fallen for more than seven years now, while
at the same time, income has increased.
Examining the house-price-to-rent ratio, it must be borne in mind
that in some euro area countries rental markets are heavily
regulated, and as a result the p/e ratios based on rents may be
distorted. Bearing this in mind, as can be seen from Table 8
below, for most euro area countries, house prices increased
15 The idea of the p/e ratio treats housing as similar to financial assets. The p/e ratio looks at
house prices relative to their yield i.e. rental incomes, and tests the idea that house prices
are not driven especially by demographics and fixed supply — since these factors should
affect rental as well. However there is a lack of long run series on rents for all countries.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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considerably faster than rents. Two exceptions to this trend are
Italy and Germany, where house prices have not kept pace
with rents.
Table 8: House-price-to-income ratio and Price/rent ratio
House-price-to-income ratio* Price/Rent Ratio
Country
1990 2003 1990 2003
US 107.14 113.66 112.68 136.48
Germany 94.81 79.71 99.32 73.07
France 118.64 124.56 115.96 129.70
Italy 129.89 130.66 100.00 91.43
Spain 198.92 288.78 207.05 249.92
Netherlands 111.43 243.14 109.94 203.58
Ireland 110.47 200.81 100.79 272.45
UK 137.00 155.83 117.20 194.28
*Ratio of house prices over disposable income per worker, also known as the ‘‘crude
affordability’’ ratio.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (September, 2004).
The measures outlined above tend to underpin the notion of
overvaluation; however, they do not present the full picture. This
is because neither measure takes interest rates into account
(McCarthy and Peach (2004)). Interest rates matter in assessing
the existence of overvaluation because they influence housing
affordability and also represent the yield on competing assets in
household’s portfolio. The downward trend in nominal mortgage
interest rates — a major feature of the housing market over the
past decade — thus has significant implications for home
ownership affordability and for the equilibrium return on housing.
Over the past ten years, the euro area economy has moved from
a higher inflation/ higher interest rate economy to a low inflation/
low interest rate economy. It is argued that as a low interest rate
economy, the burden of mortgage repayments has fallen in
recent years and housing affordability has increased. This has
underpinned the rise in the demand for housing and mortgages.
While it is unfortunate that a consistent set of comparable data
on affordability is not available which takes account of the
extremely low level of interest rates that prevail, the foregoing
suggests that over the past five years, interest-adjusted
affordability has been broadly unchanged, in contrast to a decline
in crude affordability, as reflected in the house-price-to-income
ratio.
5.2 Macroeconomic implications of higher debt levels
The higher stock of household debt increases the sensitivity of
the household sector to movements in interest rates, changes in
income and changes in house prices, while the higher house
prices rise, the greater is the potential for some eventual reversal
or slowdown in the process of MEW in those countries where
it applies.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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The decline in inflation has two effects on household borrowing.
Firstly, borrowing costs are reduced, allowing a greater number
of households to borrow and/or increase the average level of
their debt; secondly, as a consequence of lower inflation, the real
value of the debt is not eroded as fast as in the past, and hence
the proportion of income required to service debt in later years
will tend to be higher. A higher debt/income ratio means that
households will become more exposed to shocks, and, given low
inflation, will remain exposed to them for a longer period of time
than in the past. Households will also become more sensitive to
a rise in unemployment, and those that have high levels of debt
will find it more difficult to finance their mortgages in a period of
unemployment. While unemployment may only affect a small
section of the population, because households will have higher
debt service burdens for longer, they are more likely to
experience a spell of unemployment at a time when mortgage
repayments are still a significant share of household income.
Even in the absence of an economic downturn, increased
indebtedness means that the household sector is now more
exposed to declines in house prices, which could lower
consumer confidence and household spending. However, a
household’s ability to service its mortgage may not worsen, since
this is determined by the interest rate on the mortgage and the
households’ income. Finally, where MEW applies, a slowdown or
reversal in the process could have adverse macroeconomic
effects, as in the Netherlands, where a reversal of the process
reduced growth in household consumption by around 0.5
percentage points (Netherlands Bank, 2003).
Section 6: Conclusion
Since the late 1990s, the rising trend in euro area house prices
has been remarkable both in its duration and strength, persisting
during a phase of economic slowdown. However, on the basis
of the evidence examined in this paper, and contrary to the US
and UK experience, there is little to suggest that house prices
have been a major support to private consumption in the euro
area as a whole. The only exception to this finding would appear
to be the Netherlands where there is evidence that changes in
housing wealth had an impact on consumption.
As regards the determinants of house price developments in the
euro area, one of the main findings is that there appear to have
been two sets of factors at work — the common demand and
supply influences which are regularly cited, and the differing
structures of national housing markets. With regard to common
influences, the significant fall in interest rates over the past
number of years has been an important determinant of the rise
in house prices in many countries. However, as we have seen
throughout this paper, differences in the structure of housing andQuarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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mortgage markets have also played a big role. In particular, key
individual characteristics including the type of mortgage interest
rate that is predominant (i.e. fixed or variable), the loan-to-value
ratio, the existence of mortgage equity withdrawal, the owner
occupancy rate, as well as the tax treatment of owner-occupied
housing all matter and vary between countries. The scale of the
rise in house prices in a number of countries begs the question
of whether house prices are overvalued. At present, there is no
conclusive evidence on overvaluation.
In conclusion, while there are a number of different country
experiences, the evidence suggests that much can be explained
by differences in institutional characteristics and demographics
across countries. These factors are not likely to change quickly,
and housing markets are likely to remain strongly national in
character for some time to come.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2005
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